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ABSTRACT 
THE SUPERSUBSTANTIVALIST RESPONSE TO THE ARGUMENT FROM 
VAGUENESS 
 
by 
 
Mark Puestohl 
 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2013 
Under the Supervision of Professor Joshua Spencer 
 
 
 
Unrestricted Composition is the axiom of classical extensional mereology according to 
which any objects, the xs, compose some y.  Perhaps the most powerful argument for 
Unrestricted Composition is the Argument from Vagueness, which purports to secure 
Unrestricted Composition on the grounds of a few plausible theses about composition,  
vagueness, and the number of objects.  Here I present Theodore Sider’s (2001) 
formulation of the Argument from Vagueness.  I show that given supersubstantivalism—
the thesis that material objects are identical to spacetime regions—we are in a position to 
consider the Argument from Vagueness unsound.  I then consider supersubstantivalist 
responses from Andrew Wake (2010) and Nikk Effingham (2009) and argue that both are 
inferior to my own.  
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0 Introduction  
One highly controversial axiom of classical extensional mereology is Unrestricted   
Composition: 
Unrestricted Composition: For any objects the xs, there is some object y such  
that the xs compose y. 
Unrestricted Composition has surprising and pretheoretically implausible 
consequences.  For example, it follows from Unrestricted Composition that there’s a 
further object composed of all the cats in Wisconsin and the Sun.  Perhaps the most 
powerful argument for Unrestricted Composition is the Argument from Vagueness, first 
given by David Lewis (1986: 212-213) in On the Plurality of Worlds and forcefully 
articulated and defended by Theodore Sider (2001: 120-132) in Four-
Dimensionalism.1  Very roughly, the Argument from Vagueness goes something like this: 
if composition is restricted (that is, if Unrestricted Composition is false), then it may be 
indeterminate whether some objects compose another object.  But it’s never 
indeterminate whether some objects compose another object.  So, composition is 
unrestricted.  In §1, I present and explain Sider’s formulation of the Argument from 
Vagueness.  I then argue in §2 that proponents of supersubstantivalism—the thesis that 
material objects are identical to regions of spacetime—have the resources at their 
disposal to regard the Argument from Vagueness unsound.  Supersubstantivalists may 
hold that there are instances of ‘the xs compose some y’ that are neither determinately 
true nor determinately false and thus deny a crucial premise of Sider’s argument.  Two 
                                                
1 The Argument from Vagueness has generated much critical discussion.  For responses to  
Argument from Vagueness, see Carmichael (2011), Effingham (2009), Elder (2008), Korman 
(2007), Markosian (1998), Nolan (2006), and Wake (2012).  For a comprehensive introduction to 
the argument, see Korman (2010). 
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other authors have independently responded to the Argument from Vagueness on behalf 
of supersubstantivalists.  However, both responses are inadequate.  In §3, I consider 
Andrew Wake’s (2011) supersubstantivalist response, and in §4 I consider that of Nikk 
Effingham (2009). 
1 The Argument from Vagueness 
Before we can understand Sider’s formulation of the Argument from Vagueness, 
we need some terminological tools.  Let a case of composition (“case”, for short) be a 
possible situation involving some objects that have certain properties and stand in certain 
relations relevant to whether those objects compose.  Sider (2001: 123) cites a few 
putative examples of such properties and relations: qualitative homogeneity, spatial 
proximity, unity of action, comprehensiveness of causal relations, etc.  Consider two 
distinct cases.  One case, C1, is the possible situation involving the subatomic particles 
that presently compose the Moon, related to each other in the way that they actually are at 
present.  Suppose then that an asteroid collides with the Moon and scatters the particles 
that previously composed it across the galaxy.  Another case, Cn, is the possible situation 
involving those particles, related to each other as they are when they’re scattered across 
the galaxy.  Intuitively, it seems that the particles in Cn don’t compose. 
We can imagine an ordered series of cases, each ever so slightly different from 
any case that’s adjacent to it in the series.  Let a continuous series be a series with the 
following features: First, every member of the series is a distinct case.  Second, the series 
is ordered in terms of similarity: for any three distinct cases x, y, and z in the series, if x is 
adjacent to y and y is adjacent to z, then x is more similar (with respect to those properties 
and relations relevant to whether some objects compose) to y, than x is to z, and z is more 
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similar to y than z is to x.2  Third, every member of the series is extremely similar to any 
case that’s adjacent to it.  Imagine a continuous series connecting C1 on one end to Cn on 
the other.  C2, the second case in the series (the case adjacent to C1), is ever so slightly 
different from C1.  C3 is ever so slightly different from C2, and so on, all the way to Cn.   
With these terminological tools in hand, we may now consider the Argument 
from Vagueness.  Sider (2001: 123-125) formulates the argument explicitly: 
(1) If not every class has a fusion [(that is, if it’s not the case that the members of 
every class compose)], then there must be a pair of cases connected by a 
continuous series such that in one, composition occurs, but in the other, 
composition does not occur. 
(2) In no continuous series is there a sharp cut-off in whether composition occurs. 
(3) In any case, either composition definitely occurs, or composition definitely 
      does not occur. 
From (1), (2), and (3) we are supposed to conclude that Unrestricted Composition is true. 
According to (1), if not every class has a fusion, then there’s a class that actually 
doesn’t have a fusion, and thus, there’s a case in which some objects don’t actually 
compose.  But presumably it’s possible that some objects compose, and so, since a case is 
a possible situation, there’s a case in which some objects compose.  (Perhaps the case 
wherein some objects compose includes all of the same objects as the case wherein some 
objects don’t compose; perhaps not.  Nothing Sider says precludes there being a 
continuous series connecting a case including some objects, o1-on, to a case lacking some 
or all of o1-on.)  Furthermore, there are presumably many other cases with varying 
                                                
2 The first and second features of a continuous series that I mention here are only implicit in 
Sider’s (2001) discussion.   
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degrees of similarity to these two cases, so many that there’s a continuous series 
connecting the case in which some objects compose to the case in which some objects 
don’t compose.  I take it that only mereological nihilists—those who believe that 
necessarily, no objects compose—will disagree with (1).  Sider (2001: 176-180) argues 
against nihilism elsewhere, and for present purposes I grant that he’s right to reject it.3 
A sharp cut-off is a pair of adjacent cases in a continuous series, such that the 
objects in one member of the pair definitely compose but the objects in the other member 
of the pair definitely don’t compose.  Motivated by skepticism about metaphysical 
arbitrariness, (2) denies the existence of sharp cut-offs.  If in some continuous series there 
were a sharp cut-off, the exact location of that cut-off in the series would be unacceptably 
arbitrary.  The differences between any two cases in a continuous series may be 
extremely minute.  For instance, the only difference between a pair of cases in the 
continuous series connecting C1-Cn might be that in one member of the pair, some 
particles are displaced only a fraction of a nanometer from the locations that those 
particles occupy in the other member of the pair.  It seems implausible that such minute 
differences between two cases could make a difference with respect to whether some 
objects compose.  Therefore, there’s no sharp cut-off in any continuous series.4 
                                                
3 Here I also ignore that Sider (2013) has recently defended mereological nihilism. 
4 Proponents of at least one theory of linguistic vagueness will likely be inclined to reject (2).  
Epistemicists about vagueness like Williamson (1994) hold that every vague expression has a 
determinate meaning and that an expression’s vagueness consists in our ignorance of what that 
meaning is.  For example, according to epistemicists, a particular set of objects is the meaning (or, 
extension) of the vague predicate ‘sand-heap’: the set of heap-like objects composed of n grains 
or more, though we don’t know what n is.  Imagine a sorites series of putative candidates for 
heap-hood.  On our far left we have a candidate with one grain of sand, and on our far right we 
have a candidate with one billion grains, where every member differs from any member that’s 
adjacent to it by one grain.  Epistemicism famously implies that there’s a sharp cut-off in every 
sorites series.  In our heap example, a sharp cut-off would be a pair of adjacent heap-candidates 
that differ by a single grain, one of which is a heap, the other of which isn’t.  I take it that 
epistemicists would grant that there’s a sharp cut-off in every continuous series of cases as well.  
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However, showing that there are no sharp cut-offs isn’t enough to show that the 
objects in every case of a continuous series compose.  For if we admit truth value gaps, 
we might think that for some range of cases it’s indeterminate whether the objects in each 
member of that range compose, just as we might think that it’s indeterminate whether 
some things are heaps and whether some people are bald.  But (3) denies that it can be 
indeterminate whether some objects compose. 
There are roughly two ways of responding to (3).  The first appeals to 
metaphysical, or ontic vagueness.5  One might think that there’s no matter of fact about 
whether some objects compose in a given case and that there would be this indeterminacy 
even if our languages and concepts were completely precise.  However, with Lewis 
(1986: 212), Sider (2001: 125) finds the notion of metaphysical vagueness unintelligible 
and subscribes to the linguistic theory of vagueness, the theory that vagueness is only a 
feature of language, thought, and concepts, not of the concrete world.  Since I would like 
to respond to the Argument from Vagueness on Sider’s own terms, I won’t consider 
appeal to metaphysical vagueness a viable option. 
The second way of responding to (3) is in keeping with the linguistic theory of 
vagueness, and it’s this strategy that will concern us from here on out.  Perhaps it’s due to 
the vagueness of the predicates ‘heap’ and ‘bald’ that it’s indeterminate whether some 
objects are heaps and whether some individuals are bald.  Similarly, we might think that 
it’s indeterminate whether some objects compose due to vagueness in the expression “the 
xs compose”. 
                                                                                                                                            
Since Sider rejects epistemicism, I won’t consider it further, but see Sider (2001: 130-132) for an 
argument that even epistemicists should accept (2).   
5 One believer in metaphysical vagueness is van Inwagen (1990).  For a recent theory of 
metaphysical vagueness, see Barnes and Williams (2011).   
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However, Sider (2001: 123) tells us that the Argument from Vagueness isn’t just 
“another sorites”.  Indeterminacy about the truth value of ‘xs compose’ would entail 
count-indeterminacy, indeterminacy about the number of objects that exist.  And count-
indeterminacy is implausible.   
Let a numerical sentence be a sentence asserting only that for some finite number 
n, exactly n concrete objects exist.  Sider (2001: 125-132) gives the following argument, 
which I call the Argument for the Determinacy of Composition: 
(4) If in some case it were indeterminate whether some objects compose, then  
      some numerical sentence would be indeterminate in truth value. 
 (5) If some numerical sentence were indeterminate in truth value, then that     
                  numerical sentence would contain a vague expression. 
 (6) No numerical sentence contains a vague expression. 
 (7) Therefore, in no case is it indeterminate whether some objects compose.   
And (7) is equivalent to (3), the claim that in any case either composition definitely 
occurs or definitely doesn’t occur. 
(4) is motivated by the claim that whether the objects in a given case compose 
determines the number of objects in that case.  Consider a case in which there are two 
simples and nothing else.  Now consider a second case that differs from the first case in 
only one respect: the simples compose.  In the first case there are only two objects: the 
two simples.  In the second case there are three objects: the two simples plus their fusion, 
the object that the simples compose.  If in a third case it were indeterminate whether the 
simples compose, it would be indeterminate whether there are two or three objects in that 
third case.  Because numerical sentences assert exactly how many objects exist, both the 
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truth value of the numerical sentence asserting that there are exactly two objects and the 
truth value of the numerical sentence asserting that there are exactly three objects would 
be indeterminate in that third case. 
(5) claims that a numerical sentence is indeterminate in truth value only if that 
sentence contains a vague expression.  It seems that familiar claims about semantic 
compositionality are supposed to justify (5).  The truth value of a sentence is a function 
of the meanings of its parts.  Therefore, if the truth value of a sentence is indeterminate, 
then the meaning of at least one of its parts must be indeterminate as well.6 
But (6) has it that numerical sentences don’t contain vague expressions.  Notice 
that we may express any numerical sentence using a language that’s arguably free from 
vagueness: the vocabulary of pure first-order predicate logic with identity and the 
predicate ‘concrete’.  For example, the following formula asserts that exactly two 
concrete objects exist: 
(8) ∃x∃y[Cx & Cy & x ≠ y & ∀z(Cz → (x = z ∨ y = z))].  
Sider needs to restrict the quantifiers of his numerical sentences with the concreteness 
predicate (C) because one might think that there are uncountably many abstract objects 
(like, for instance, the real numbers).  If there are uncountably many abstract objects and 
the quantifiers of numerical sentences aren’t restricted to concrete objects, then (4) will 
be false.  There may be a case in which it’s indeterminate whether some objects compose 
while in that case the truth value of every numerical sentence is determinate.  Consider a 
case in which there are infinitely many abstract objects and some concrete 
                                                
6 Sider doesn’t explicitly give this argument from semantic compositionality, and I take it that not 
everyone will buy it.  However, if (5) is false, then so much the worse for the Argument from 
Vagueness.  Simply assuming that (5) is true for the sake of argument will serve my purposes 
here. 
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objects.  Without a restriction to the concrete objects, a numerical sentence will be true in 
that case if and only if it asserts that there are infinitely many objects.  But a numerical 
sentence asserting that there are infinitely many objects will be true in that case whether 
or not a given pair of concrete objects compose.  And this is inconsistent with (4), since 
(4) claims that indeterminacy about whether some objects compose in a given case entails 
count-indeterminacy in that case. 
Now, Sider (2003: 137-138) accepts a precisificational conception of vagueness: 
an expression e is vague only if e has multiple precisifications: multiple equally plausible 
precise meaning candidates (or perhaps, extension candidates).7  Given (5), if (8) is 
indeterminate in truth value, then (8) must contain a vague expression.  But it seems that 
no expression in (8) has multiple precisifications.  It’s hard to see what the 
precisifications of the truth-functional operators or ‘=’ could be.  The concreteness 
predicate ‘C’ doesn’t seem to have precisifications either, since Sider defines it 
stipulatively using a list of predicates for fundamental ontological kinds: x is concrete if 
and only if x isn’t a set, class, number, property, relation, universal, trope, possible world, 
or possible situation (or any other entity that your views regard abstract).  And these 
predicates seem not to admit of borderline cases.  That leaves us with the unrestricted 
quantifiers, and Sider (2001: 128-129) argues that they too are precise.  If the unrestricted 
                                                
7 Sider (2003: 138) holds that the precisificational conception of vagueness is consistent with 
many going theories of linguistic vagueness.  However, just what it’s supposed to be for an 
expression to have multiple precisifications depends on which theorist you ask.  Both 
supervaluationists (Fine 1975, Keefe 2000) and certain nihilists about linguistic vagueness (Braun 
and Sider 2007) hold that no one of an expression’s precisifications is that expression’s unique 
meaning (or extension).  Epistemicists (Williamson 1994) hold that every vague expression has 
some precisification as its unique meaning (or extension), but we don’t (or can’t!) know which.  
Others hold that which precisification an expression means (or has as its extension) is in some 
way a function of context (Raffman 1994, Shapiro 2008, Soames 1999) or our interests (Fara 
2000).  For all its plausibility, however, the precisificational conception has its critics.  See 
Collins and Varzi (2000).   
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existential quantifier ‘∃’ is vague, then ‘∃’ has multiple precisifications, and it seems that 
if a quantifier has multiple precisifications, then those precisifications would have to have 
distinct domains.  Let’s say that it’s indeterminate whether ‘∃’ has as its domain d1 or 
d2.  Since d1 and d2 are distinct, there must be some object that’s a member of one domain 
but not the other.  But if either d1 or d2 contains an object that the other doesn’t contain, 
then the domain lacking that object is restricted and an inadequate precisification of ‘∃’, 
since by hypothesis, ‘∃’ is unrestricted.  Therefore, ‘∃’ is not both vague and 
unrestricted.8 
Let’s take a moment to recap by briefly summarizing the Argument from 
Vagueness.  If composition is restricted, then there’s a continuous series connecting a 
case wherein some objects compose to a case wherein some objects fail to 
compose.  There are no sharp cut-offs in any continuous series.  Nor are there vague cut-
offs: ranges of cases wherein it’s indeterminate whether the objects in each of those cases 
compose.  For indeterminacy about whether some objects in any case compose entails 
count-indeterminacy in that case.  But there’s no count-indeterminacy.  So there’s no 
continuous series connecting a case wherein some objects compose to a case wherein 
some objects fail to compose.  Composition is unrestricted. 
2 Supersubstantivalism 
Various philosophers, including Sider (2001: 110-114, Forthcoming: 32) himself, 
have been attracted to supersubstantivalism, the thesis that x is a material object only if x 
                                                
8 For two more arguments that unrestricted quantifiers are precise (one of which is supposed to be 
a successor to the (2001) argument above), see Sider (2003).   
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is a region of spacetime.9  One consideration that proponents cite as a reason to believe 
that supersubstantivalism is true is its parsimony.  A theory according to which material 
objects are numerically identical to regions is simpler than a theory according to which 
material objects occupy regions but are numerically distinct from the regions that they 
occupy.  However, here I won’t consider any arguments for supersubstantivalism, as here 
I’m just concerned to show that the supersubstantivalist has a natural response to the 
Argument from Vagueness in her bag. 
My argument is this: supersubstantivalists are under pressure to include the 
monadic predicate ‘is a material object’ in their formulations of numerical sentences.  But 
supersubstantivalists are also free to regard that predicate vague.  It follows that 
supersubstantivalists are free to deny (6), the premise of the Argument for the 
Determinacy of Composition according to which no numerical sentence contains a vague 
expression.  Supersubstantivalists may then regard some numerical sentences, and 
accordingly, some instances of ‘the xs compose’, indeterminate in truth value and deny 
(3).  This section will proceed as follows: In §2.1 I’ll argue that supersubstantivalists are 
committed to including a material object predicate in their formulations of numerical 
sentences.  Then in §2.2 I’ll show using an example that supersubstantivalists may 
intelligibly regard that material object predicate vague and blame indeterminacy of 
numerical sentences’ truth values on that predicate.  For ease of discussion, I’ll 
henceforth assume that supersubstantivalism is true. 
                                                
9 Though I should note that Sider (2001: 110-114) advances the conditional claim that if 
substantivalism (the thesis that points and spacetime regions exist) is true, then so is 
supersubstantivalism.  Other philosophers friendly to supersubstantivalism include Field (1984), 
Heller (1990), Lewis (1986), and Quine (1976, 1995).  See Skow (2005: 54-71) for an extended 
treatment.  Schaffer (2009: 134) defends a stronger form of supersubstantivalism, according to 
which x is a material object if and only if x is a region of spacetime. 
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Before I proceed, however, a note about my commitments.  The response to Sider 
I will put forth will be mereologically pluralist, in that on this proposal, the mereology of 
material objects and the mereology of spacetime pull apart.  I will endorse a mereology of 
material objects according to which Unrestricted Composition is false, but I will endorse 
a mereology of spacetime regions according to which a principle analogous to 
Unrestricted Composition is true: Any regions the, rs, have a union.10  It follows that 
given any material objects, there is some region that those objects together exactly 
occupy.  Thus, there are gerrymandered regions, all of whose subregions are occupied by 
material objects.  Now, on supersubstantivalism, an object occupies a region if and only 
if the object is identical to that region.  So, throw supersubstantivalism into this cocktail 
and the result is that all the subregions of a given region r may be identical to material 
objects, though r is not itself identical to a material object. 
2.1 The material object predicate 
Given supersubstantivalism, all material objects are spacetime regions, but not all 
spacetime regions are material objects.11  So, it seems that ‘is a material object’ is a 
predicate that some spacetime regions satisfy and some spacetime regions fail to satisfy.  
Just as Sider was forced to include the concreteness predicate in his formulations of 
numerical sentences, we must include the material object predicate in our formulations of 
numerical sentences.  It’s plausible that there are infinitely many spacetime regions.  
Furthermore, it’s plausible that all spacetime regions are concrete.  (One plausible feature 
                                                
10 To say that a region r is the union of rʹ′ and rʹ′ʹ′ is to say that rʹ′ and rʹ′ʹ′ are subregions of r, and 
anything else that’s a subregion of r has a subregion in common with rʹ′ or rʹ′ʹ′. 
11 Here one might question the distinction between concrete objects that are also material (the 
material objects) and the concrete objects that aren’t also material (the regions that are not also 
material objects).  For it might have seemed plausible that an object is concrete if and only if that 
object is material.   
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of concrete objects is that they causally interact with other concrete objects, and the 
results of relativistic physics seem to require that spacetime itself interacts causally with 
concrete objects.)  But if the quantifiers of numerical sentences are allowed to range over 
everything that’s concrete, then (4) will be false.  There may be a case in which it’s 
indeterminate whether some concrete objects compose while in that case the truth value 
of every numerical sentence is determinate. 
Consider a case S in which there are infinitely many regions and two material 
simples.  Suppose also that if there’s any composite object in S, it’s the object that the 
simples compose.  Sider would claim that the following are correct formulations of 
numerical sentences and that one or the other expresses how many concrete objects exist 
in S: 
(8) ∃x∃y[Cx & Cy & x ≠ y & ∀z(Cz → (x = z ∨ y = z))]  
(9) ∃w∃x∃y[Cw & Cx & Cy & w ≠ x & x ≠ y & w ≠ y &  
      ∀z(Cz → (w = z ∨ x = z ∨ y = z))]. 
However, given supersubstantivalism, both (8) and (9) will be false in S.  A numerical 
sentence will be true in S if and only if it asserts that there are infinitely many concrete 
objects.  But a numerical sentence asserting that there are infinitely many concrete 
objects will be true in S whether or not our pair of material simples compose.  And this is 
inconsistent with (4), since (4) claims that indeterminacy about whether some objects 
compose in a given case entails count-indeterminacy in that case. 
The upshot here is that on pain of falsifying (4), we shouldn’t agree that Sider has 
shown us the correct way to formulate numerical sentences.  I suggest that we supplant 
(8) and (9), respectively, with the following formulas: 
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(10) ∃x∃y[Cx & Ox & Cy & Oy & x ≠ y & ∀z((Cz & Oz) → (x = z ∨ y = z))] 
(11) ∃w∃x∃y[Cw & Ow & Cx & Ox Cy & Oy & w ≠ x & x ≠ y & w ≠ y &  
                ∀z((Cz & Oz) → (w = z ∨ x = z ∨ y = z))]. 
The only difference between (8) and (9) on one hand and (10) and (11) on the other is 
that the quantifiers of (10) and (11) are restricted to the material objects using the 
material object predicate, ‘O’.  Neither (10) nor (11) cause trouble for (4), since 
indeterminacy about whether our two material simples compose does result in 
indeterminacy about whether (10) or (11) is true. 
2.2 As a vague predicate 
We now have the resources at our disposal to resist (3), the premise of the 
Argument from Vagueness according to which it can’t be indeterminate whether some 
objects compose.  We may intelligibly regard the material object predicate vague, for we 
may consider it to have multiple precisifications.  There are multiple sets of spacetime 
regions, all of which are equally plausible meaning (or extension) candidates for the 
material object predicate, though no one of which is that predicate’s determinate meaning 
(or extension).  On one way of making ‘is a material object’ precise, its meaning (or 
extension) is a certain set of spacetime regions; on another way of making it precise, its 
meaning (or extension) is another set of spacetime regions.  Therefore, we may hold that 
numerical sentences do include a vague expression, contra Sider’s Argument for the 
Determinacy of Composition. 
I will illustrate how the material object predicate could be vague using an 
example similar to that of the two simples from the previous section.  Again, suppose that 
there are at least two material objects—two simples—and at most three: two simples plus 
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their fusion.  For simplicity, let’s suppose, implausibly, that the only relation relevant to 
whether some objects compose is spatial proximity.  When some objects are sufficiently 
close together, they compose, but when some objects are sufficiently far apart, they don’t 
compose.  Let S1 be a case in which two simples are close together, and let S5 be a case 
in which two simples are (relatively) far apart. 
 
Figure 1: A continuous series connecting case S1 to case S5 
Figure 1 represents a continuous series connecting S1 to S5.12  Each square box is a 
spacetime region.  R1 is continuous with R2; R2 is continuous with R3, and so on.  Each 
square blackened region is a simple.  Notice that a different pair of simples exists in 
every case.  The simples in S1 are R1 and R2; the simples in S2 are R1 and R3, and so 
forth.  The simples in S1 are touching and therefore compose a further object.  Let’s 
stipulate that the simples in S2 are close enough together that they compose as well.  So, 
                                                
12 I realize that the fewer cases there are in a continuous series, the less implausible sharp cut-offs 
seem.  After all, one might think that a natural cut-off in the series represented by Figure 1 is just 
the cut-off between S1 and S2!  However, I take it that my strategy for dealing with the series that 
Figure 1 represents will generalize to more realistic examples.   
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in both S1 and S2, there are three objects: in each case two simples and the object the two 
simples compose.13  Let’s also stipulate that the simples in both S4 and S5 are far enough 
apart that they don’t compose.  So, in both S4 and S5, there are only two objects: two 
simples in each case.  That leaves us with the case in the middle.  Suppose that it’s 
indeterminate whether the simples in S3 compose. 
With these stipulations, let’s now take a look at precisifications for the objecthood 
predicate.  Given that by hypothesis, the simples in S1 and the simples in S2 compose, 
the simples in S4 and the simples in S5 don’t compose, and the simples in S3 neither 
compose nor don’t compose, we may specify the precisifications of ‘material object’ 
extensionally with the following sets of regions: 
(P1) {R1S1, R2S1, (R1+R2)S1, R1S2, R3S2, (R1+R3)S2, R1S3, R4S3, (R1+R4)S3, R1S4,  
          R5S4, R1S5, R6S5} 
(P2) {R1S1, R2S1, (R1+R2)S1, R1S2, R3S2, (R1+R3)S2, R1S3, R4S3, R1S4, R5S4, R1S5,     
          R6S5} 
(P1) is one precisification for the predicate ‘is a material object’; (P2) is another.  My 
notation in (P1) and (P2) is a bit unusual.  Where i, j, and k are variables ranging over the 
integers, ‘RjSi’ denotes region Rj indexed to the case Si.  ‘R1S1’ therefore denotes R1 in 
S1.  ‘(Rj+Rk)Si’ denotes the region (Rj+Rk), the region that is the union of Rj and Rk, 
also indexed to Si.  ‘(R1+R2)S1’ therefore denotes the region (R1+R2) in S1.  R1S1 is 
definitely a material object, since it’s a member of every admissible precisification.  So 
are R2S1, (R1+R2)S1, and so on.  Some unions of regions are discontinuous.  For example, 
the subregions of (R1+R3)S2 are R1 and R3.  However, R1and R3 aren’t continuous, so 
                                                
13 Notice that since R1 and R3 are discontinuous in S2, my claim that there’s an object in S2 with 
R1 and R3 as parts requires that I admit the existence of discontinuous regions, though this view 
isn’t especially controversial.   
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the union of R1 and R3 is discontinuous.  (R1+R6)S5 is definitely not a material object 
since it’s a member of no admissible precisification.  Notice that it’s indeterminate 
whether (R1+R4)S3 is a material object, since (R1+R4)S3 is a member of one but not all 
admissible precisifications. 
Since the material object predicate is vague, sentences in which it occurs inherit 
its vagueness.  Thus, (10) (the supersubstantivalist’s numerical sentence asserting that 
there are exactly two material objects) and (11) (the supersubstantivalist’s numerical 
sentence asserting that there are exactly three material objects) will both be indeterminate 
in S3.  If ‘material object’ means (or has as its extension) (P1), then (11) will be true and 
(10) will be false in S3.  If ‘material object’ means (or has as its extension) (P2), then 
(10) will be true and (11) will be false in S3.  Since it’s indeterminate whether ‘material 
object’ means (or has as its extension) (P1) or (P2), both (10) and (11) are indeterminate 
in S3. 
Sider would have us believe that (8) and (9) are correct formulations of numerical 
sentences and that numerical sentences can’t be indeterminate in truth-value because they 
contain no vague expressions.  But as we’ve seen above, numerical sentences must 
contain the material object predicate.  (10) and (11) do include the material object 
predicate.  When asked to point to a vague expression in (10) and (11), there’s an obvious 
candidate: the predicate ‘O’ (‘is a material object’) is to blame. 
3 Wake’s supersubstantivalist response 
Andrew Wake (2011) also suggests that supersubstantivalists have the resources 
to deny (3), the claim that it’s never indeterminate whether some objects 
compose.  However, while my strategy for responding to the Argument for the 
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Determinacy of Composition is to deny (6), the claim that no numerical sentence contains 
a vague expression, Wake’s strategy is to deny (5), the claim that indeterminacy about 
composition entails count-indeterminacy.  Wake (2011: 28) suggests that we employ the 
following vocabulary: ‘exists’, ‘is a region’, ‘is a sub-region of’, ‘is a proper sub-region 
of’, and ‘is a proper part of’.  And while I recommend that the supersubstantivalist regard 
vague the monadic predicate ‘material object’, Wake (2010: 28) recommends that the 
supersubstantivalist regard vague the dyadic predicate ‘is a proper part of’. 
Like me, Wake denies (3) and holds that with respect to our example, it may be 
indeterminate whether the simples in a given case compose.  Given the stipulations that 
we made above about whether the simples in each of S1 through S5 compose, Wake 
would explain these facts about composition in terms of proper parthood.  The simples in 
S1 compose, since the simples in S1 are proper parts of (R1+R2).  The simples in S2 
compose as well, since they’re proper parts of (R1+R3).  The simples in S4 aren’t proper 
parts, and neither are the simples in S5.  So neither the simples in S4 nor the simples in 
S5 compose.  Finally, it’s indeterminate whether the simples in S3 compose, since it’s 
indeterminate whether those simples are proper parts.  If the simples in S3 are proper 
parts, then they compose.  If they’re not proper parts, then they don’t compose. 
Unlike me, though, Wake denies (4) and contends that whether the simples in a 
given case compose does not entail count-indeterminacy in that case.  According to Wake, 
the following numerical sentence is true in each of S1 through S5: 
(9) ∃w∃x∃y[Cw & Cx & Cy & w ≠ x & x ≠ y & w ≠ y &  
      ∀z(Cz → (w = z ∨ x = z ∨ y = z))]. 
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But it’s not clear what Wake understands (9)’s quantifiers to range over in every 
case.  Let’s introduce a neutral term and say that those quantifiers range over the entities 
in each case.  So, according to Wake there are three entities in S1 and three entities in S2: 
R1 and R2 are proper parts of (R1+R2) in S1, and R1 and R3 are proper parts of (R1+R3) 
in S2.  But Wake thinks that there are three entities in S4 and three entities in S5 as well, 
even though no simples compose in either of those cases.  In S4 neither R1 nor R5 are 
proper parts of any entity.  Nevertheless, there’s a third entity in S4: 
(R1+R5).14  Similarly, in S5, R1 and R6 aren’t proper parts of any entity either.  But 
there’s a third entity in this case as well: (R1+R6).  There are also three entities in S3 on 
both precisifications of the proper parthood predicate.  On one precisification, R1 and R4 
are proper parts of (R1+R4).  On another precisification, R1 and R4 aren’t proper parts of 
any other entity.  But either way, there are three entities in S3. 
Consider the cases wherein no entities compose: S4 and S5.  There’s supposed to 
be a third entity in each of these cases.  (There’s also supposed to be a third entity in S3 
with respect to one precisification of ‘proper part’.)  That third entity in S4 is (R1+R5), 
and in S5 it’s (R1+R6).  (The third entity that exists in S3 with respect to one 
precisification is (R1+R4)S3).  It seems clear that the entities in S1 and S2 are all 
supposed to be material objects.  In S1, R1 and R2 are material simples, and they’re the 
only proper parts of (R1+R2).  Similarly, in S2, R1 and R3 are material simples as well, 
and they’re the only proper parts of (R1+R3).  However, it’s unclear whether Wake 
thinks that (R1+R5)S4 and (R1+R6)S5 are material or immaterial objects.  If Wake 
                                                
14 Wake (2011: 24) is also a mereological pluralist and states upfront that he rejects the following 
claim: Necessarily, if r is a proper subregion of rʹ′, then r is a proper part of rʹ′.  In other words, 
there are pairs of regions (r, rʹ′), such that r is a proper subregion of rʹ′, but r isn’t a proper part of 
rʹ′.   
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understands (R1+R5)S4 and (R1+R6)S5 to be immaterial, presumably he understands them 
to be mere regions, regions that lack whatever property or properties regions have 
whenever they’re also material objects.  (Whatever we should say about (R1+R5)S4 and 
(R1+R6)S5 we should presumably also say about (R1+R4)S3 with respect to one 
precisification of the proper parthood predicate.)  Either way of understanding Wake’s 
proposal leads to trouble, though, and my own supersubstantivalist response is superior to 
both of them. 
Suppose that Wake understands (R1+R5)S4 and (R1+R6)S5 to be material 
objects.  Then according to Wake’s view, (R1+R5)S4 and (R1+R6)S5 are discontinuous 
extended material simples, and in S3, one precisification of ‘proper part’ will have it that 
(R1+R4) is a discontinuous extended material simple.  Iterate the procedure represented 
in Figure 1 for displacing the simples until there’s a case in which two simples are 
located trillions of light-years away from each other.  Each of these simples is a particular 
region.  Wake’s response to the argument from vagueness would commit us to admitting 
the possibility of a discontinuous extended simple that is the union of these two 
regions.  One motivation for attempting to resist the argument from vagueness is that its 
conclusion entails the existence of strange fusions, like the fusion of all the cats in 
Wisconsin and the Sun.  But transgalactic material simples seem just as bizarre as the 
solar feline-fusions that we set out to avoid in the first place.  Insofar as we’re motivated 
to resist accepting strange fusions like these into our ontology, we should reject this first 
interpretation of Wake’s proposal. 
However, there’s a second interpretation of Wake’s proposal.  We might think the 
third entity that exists in each case wherein some entities fail to compose is an immaterial 
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object—a mere region—rather than a region that’s also a material object.  This second 
interpretation requires Wake to hold that for some cases in the series represented by 
Figure 1, the class of concrete entities that exists in those cases includes both material 
objects and mere regions.  The entities in S1 and S2 are all material objects, and with 
respect to one precisification of ‘proper part’, the entities in S3 are all material objects as 
well.  But the entities in S4 and the entities in S5 are diverse: R1S4 and R5S4 are material 
while (R1+R5)S4 is immaterial, and R1S5 and R6S5 are material while (R1+R6)S5 is 
immaterial.  With respect to one precisification of ‘proper part’, the objects in S3 are also 
diverse: R1S3 and R4S3 are material while (R1+R4)S3 is immaterial. 
This second interpretation of Wake’s proposal has its own problems, 
though.  Without revision, Wake’s proposal doesn’t allow him to make general claims 
about the material objects.  Wake wants to say that in every case of the continuous series 
connecting S1 to S5, there are three objects.  That is, in every case, (9) is true.  If (9) is 
true in every case, then on my second interpretation of Wake’s proposal, in some cases 
(9)’s quantifiers range over a diverse bunch of objects.  (9) tells us that there are exactly 
three concrete objects.  But we may well want to know how many of those concrete 
objects are material.  As it stands, Wake’s proposal has no way of making claims about 
all and only the material objects.  This is a strange result.  There seems to be an 
interesting difference between the material objects and the objects that are mere regions, 
and it’s unsatisfying that Wake’s proposal doesn’t countenance this difference. 
In order to state precisely how many material objects exist, it seems that Wake will have 
to introduce a material object predicate.  He then has two options: in introducing the 
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material object predicate he may either define it in terms of other vocabulary that he 
employs, or he may define it extensionally. 
Wake can’t define a material object predicate in terms of other vocabulary he 
employs, for he simply doesn’t employ any suitable vocabulary.  For example, Wake 
can’t use either of the following definitions: 
(*) x is a material object =df x is a proper part of some y 
(**) x is a material object =df some y is a proper part of x. 
(*) won’t work because it doesn’t recognize certain composite material objects that aren’t 
themselves proper parts of anything.  (**) is inadequate because it doesn’t recognize 
material simples.  Since the only other vocabulary that Wake (2010: 28) employs are the 
predicates ‘exists’, ‘is a region’, ‘is a subregion of’, and ‘is a proper subregion of’, it isn’t 
clear how else he could try to define ‘material object’. 
If Wake introduces a material object predicate, he is of course free to define that 
predicate extensionally, just as I did when I introduced my material object predicate (of 
which (P1) and (P2) are precisifications).  However, this way of introducing the material 
object predicate comes at a cost.  If Wake introduces his material object predicate 
extensionally, it seems that he’ll be unable to explain the connection between the 
vagueness of the material object predicate and the vagueness of ‘proper part’.  We saw 
above that Wake holds that ‘proper part’ is vague.  But the vagueness of ‘proper part’ 
will presumably affect the number of material objects there are, even if it doesn’t affect 
the number of objects simpliciter.  Consider again the continuous series represented by 
Figure 1.  According to Wake, though there are three objects in S3 on both 
precisifications of ‘proper part’, it’s indeterminate whether there are two or three material 
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objects.  On one precisification, all three of those objects are material.  On another 
precisification, two of those objects are material, and the other, being a mere region, is 
immaterial.  If Wake simply defines both ‘proper part’ and ‘material object’ extensionally, 
then no feature of his view will explain why the vagueness of ‘proper part’ and the 
vagueness of ‘material object’ are connected in this way. 
I must also explain the connection between the vagueness of ‘proper part’ and the 
vagueness of ‘material object’, for on my view, if it’s indeterminate whether some region 
is a material object, then it will be indeterminate whether its subregions (if it has any) are 
proper parts of it.  But I can easily explain this connection, since I can give the following 
intuitive definition of ‘proper part’: 
Proper Parthood: x is a proper part of y =df x is a proper subregion of y and y is  
a material object. 
I contend that the material object predicate is vague.  Since the definiens of Proper 
Parthood contains ‘material object’, ‘proper part’ inherits the vagueness of ‘material 
object’.  As a result, the claim that x is a proper part of y is indeterminate in truth value 
just in case it’s indeterminate whether y is a material object.  For example, on my 
proposal, it’s indeterminate whether R1S3 is a proper part of (R1+R4)S3.  Given Proper 
Parthood, to say that it’s indeterminate whether R1S3 is a proper part of (R1+R4)S3 is just 
to say that it’s indeterminate whether R1S3 is both a proper subregion of (R1+R4)S3 and 
that (R1+R4)S3 is a material object.  And, as we saw above, it is indeterminate whether 
(R1+R4)S3 is a material object on my proposal.  (R1+R4)S3 is a material object on one 
precisification of ‘material object’, namely (P1), but not the other.  Thus, it’s 
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indeterminate whether R1S3 is a proper part of (R1+R4)S3 because it’s indeterminate 
whether (R1+R4)S3 is a material object. 
4 Effingham’s supersubstantivalist response 
  Nikk Effingham (2009) also has a supersubstantivalist response to the Argument 
from Vagueness.  According to Effingham, Sider is committed to a contradiction, given 
supersubstantivalism: the affirmation and denial of the claim that all regions are concrete.   
Typically, regions are all taken to be concrete or all taken to be non-concrete, but 
Effingham argues that insofar as one accepts both the Argument from Vagueness and 
supersubstantivalism, one is committed to the claim that 
 (12) Some but not all regions are concrete. 
Supersubstantivalism precludes that all regions are non-concrete.  If all regions are non- 
concrete and material objects just are spacetime regions, then material objects will also be 
non-concrete, which is implausible.   
But it can’t be that all regions are concrete either.  Effingham’s argument that not 
all regions are concrete runs exactly parallel to my own argument that we must include a 
material object predicate in our formulations of numerical sentences (as well as Sider’s 
argument that his numerical sentences must include a concreteness predicate).  Suppose 
that all regions are concrete.  It’s plausible that there are infinitely many regions.  If so, 
then a numerical sentence will be true in a given case if and only if it asserts that 
infinitely many concrete objects exist.  But then indeterminacy about whether some 
objects compose doesn’t entail count-indeterminacy, and again we run afoul of (4).   
 Effingham (2009: 39) notes that one might be squeamish about (12), but then so 
much the worse for Sider’s argument.  Let’s take a moment to compare my own proposal 
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to Effingham’s.  I presupposed that the supersubstantivalist would either take every 
region to be concrete or take every region to be non-concrete, and I assumed that 
supersubstantivalists would prefer the former.  I then took the fact that accepting 
infinitely many concrete regions falsifies (4) to motivate restricting the quantifiers of 
numerical sentences.  Effingham, on the other hand, takes the fact that accepting 
infinitely many concrete regions falsifies (4) to motivate a revisionary thesis about 
whether spacetime is concrete.  Though I do consider it a virtue of my proposal that it 
isn’t revisionary in this way, I will grant here that Effingham is right to say that 
supersubstantivalists should consider some but not all regions concrete, on pain of 
falsifying (4).   
 At the same time, Effingham (2009: 40-41) thinks that given supersubstantivalism, 
the proponent of the Argument from Vagueness is committed, against (12), to the claim 
that either all regions are concrete or no regions are concrete.  Let a case of concreticity 
be a possible situation consisting of a region and the properties it instantiates.  His 
argument runs exactly parallel to the Argument from Vagueness:  
(13) If not all regions are concrete (but some of them are), then there must be a  
        pair of cases of concreticity connected by a continuous series such that in     
        one, a region is concrete, but in the other, a region isn’t concrete.   
 (14) In no continuous series is there a sharp cut-off in whether a region is concrete  
                    or not.    
(15) In any case of concreticity, a region is either definitely concrete or definitely  
        not concrete. 
            (16) So, either all regions are concrete or none of them are. 
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Before we can appreciate this argument, we need a certain lemma: 
(17) It’s not the case that for any regions, the rs, if the rs are concrete, then the  
        union of the rs is concrete.  
To see why (17) is true, suppose that it’s false; suppose that any concrete regions have a 
concrete union.  Imagine again a case involving two simples.  If there’s any composite 
object in the case, it’s the object that the simples compose.  The simples have a union, 
given that the simples are identical to regions, and any regions have a union.  But since 
the simples are concrete material objects, their union will also be concrete.  Thus, there 
will definitely be three concrete objects whether the simples compose or not.  Again, 
indeterminacy about whether some objects compose will fail to imply count-
indeterminacy.  So, in order to preserve the truth of (4), we should accept (17).   
 With this lemma in hand, let’s now consider each of the premises of the argument 
in turn.  Effingham explains (13) with an example:  
 
 
Figure 2: A continuous series connecting case w1 to case wn 
  
26 
Suppose that x and y are material objects.  In case w1, x is identical to the union of regions 
r1 and r2, while y is identical to the union of r3 and r4.  Furthermore, r1 and r2 are each 
proper parts of x, and r3 and r4 are each proper parts of y.  Now, let R be the union of r2 
and r3.  Assuming that composition is restricted, we can stipulate that r2 and r3 fail to 
compose.  It follows that the region R isn’t occupied by (i.e., isn’t identical to) a material 
object.  With our lemma (17) in place, we may also stipulate that though r2 and r3 are 
concrete, their union R isn’t concrete.   
 Now consider continuous series of cases of concreticity.  In case w2, x and y each 
occupy regions that are exceedingly similar to the regions that they occupy in w1: regions 
that have almost exactly the same subregions as the regions that they occupy in w1.15, 16  
There are presumably many more cases in the series, in each of which x and y occupy 
exceedingly similar regions to the regions that they occupy in adjacent cases.  In w1000, x 
and y occupy regions that are quite different from the regions they occupy in w2.  
However, in w1000, x and y occupy regions that are exceedingly similar to those that they 
occupy in both w999 and w1001.  Finally, we reach wn, in which y occupies region R.  Since, 
y is a concrete material object and is identical to R in wn, R is concrete in wn.  Thus, we 
have a continuous series connecting a case in which a particular region is non-concrete to 
a case in which that region is concrete.  (13) seems true. 
 We may be tempted to deny (14), and hold that there is a sharp cut-off in the 
continuous series represented by Figure 2.  Claiming that there is a sharp cut-off in this 
                                                
15 Note that on supersubstantivalism, an object occupies a particular region if and only if that 
object is identical to that region.  So, Effingham’s example requires that we accept contingent 
identity.  In w1, x occupies a particular region, the union of r1 and r2, but there’s a possible 
situation in which x occupies a distinct region.  That is to say, it’s possible that x is identical to a 
different region.  So, the claim that x is identical to the union of r1 and r2 is contingently true in w1. 
16 Also notice that Effingham’s example requires that it’s merely contingent which objects are 
concrete.  This seems to be a somewhat strange result. 
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series would amount to claiming that there is some pair of cases in the series, such that a 
region is concrete in one member of the pair, but an exceedingly similar region is not 
concrete in the other member of the pair.  But just as sharp cut-offs in a continuous series 
of cases of composition seemed implausible, so too do sharp cut-offs in the series 
represented by Figure 2.  Precisely where the sharp cut-off occurs in the series would 
seem to be metaphysically arbitrary.  It’s unclear what could explain why the cut-off 
occurs at one place in the series rather than another.  Furthermore, it would seem that if 
there were some explanation for why a sharp cut-off occurs here rather than there in a 
continuous series for concreticity, it’s unclear why the same couldn’t explain why a sharp 
cut-off occurs here rather than there in a continuous series for composition.  Effingham 
(2009: 41) tells us that the only changes there are from case to case in the series 
represented by Figure 2 are changes in what natural properties point-sized subregions of 
R instantiate.  If a region’s instantiating a certain property explains why a region is 
definitely concrete (and thus explains a sharp cut-off with respect to concreticity), it’s 
unclear why instantiating that property couldn’t also explain why some objects compose 
(and thus explain a sharp cut-off with respect to composition).      
 One may wish to deny (15) and hold that “concrete” is vague, but then one will be 
forced to deny (6), the premise of the Argument for the Determinacy of Composition 
according to which no numerical sentence contains a vague expression.  Thus, it seems 
that we are committed to holding that every region is concrete (or none of them are), and 
we have a contradiction with (12).  
 Yet, I think that Effingham hasn’t given us a convincing response to the 
Argument from Vagueness.  For Sider can embrace each of (13)-(15) and combine them 
  
28 
with the premises of his original Argument from Vagueness.  The result is an argument 
that’s exactly parallel to the Argument from Vagueness for Unrestricted Composition.  
Call this the “Second Argument from Vagueness”: 
 (18) If composition and concreteness are restricted, then there is a continuous  
                    series of cases, at one end of which composition occurs and a region is  
                    concrete, but at the other end neither composition occurs, nor is a region  
                    concrete. 
(19) In no continuous series is there a sharp cut-off in whether composition occurs  
        or in whether a region is concrete.  
 (20) In any case, composition either definitely occurs or definitely doesn’t occur,  
          and a region is either definitely concrete or definitely non-concrete.   
 (21) So, it’s not the case that both composition and concreteness are restricted.   
(21) is equivalent to the disjunctive thesis that  
 (22) Either composition is unrestricted, or concreteness is unrestricted, or both.   
That is, either any concrete objects compose, or every region is concrete, or both.  Before 
further discussing the Second Argument from Vagueness, let’s note that Sider, insofar as 
he’s a supersubstantivalist, should find the following principle independently plausible: 
 (23) For any regions, the rs, the rs compose iff the union of the rs is concrete.   
The left to right direction of the biconditional seems plausible for at least the following 
reason.  The Argument from Vagueness depends on the success of the Argument for the 
Determinacy of Composition.  According to the Argument for the Determinacy of 
Composition, there is no vague cut-off because indeterminacy about whether some 
concrete objects compose entails indeterminacy about the number of concrete objects, 
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and this kind of count-indeterminacy is impossible.  Given supersubstantivalism, 
whenever some objects, the rs, compose, the resulting composite object will be the union 
of the rs.  If the left to right direction is false and it’s possible for some concrete objects 
to compose without the resulting composite object being concrete, then it’s hard to see 
how indeterminacy about whether some concrete objects compose could entail count-
indeterminacy.  In a case where the rs don’t compose, there are n concrete objects.  But in 
a case where the rs compose and their union isn’t concrete, there will also be n, rather 
than n + 1 concrete objects.  If there are definitely n concrete objects whether the rs 
compose or not, indeterminacy about composition doesn’t entail count-indeterminacy.  
(4) would again be false. 
 Furthermore, various authors have embraced “harmony” between the mereology 
of material objects and the mereology of space.17  If material objects and spacetime 
regions obey the same mereological principles, then (23) seems to follow, as long as we 
also accept the plausible principle that all material objects are concrete (and 
supersubstantivalism).  There is no reason Sider cannot also hold that material objects 
and spacetime regions obey the same mereological principles, so there seems to be no 
reason he cannot also accept (23). 
 We may now see why Sider can happily accept the conclusion of the Second 
Argument from Vagueness in conjunction with (23).  By endorsing both the Second 
Argument from Vagueness and (23), Sider can countenance all of the exotic and 
gerrymandered material objects that he would have countenanced by simply endorsing 
the first Argument from Vagueness.  Consider the region exactly occupied by the Eiffel 
                                                
17 See Schaffer (2009) and Uzquiano (2011). 
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Tower and the region exactly occupied by the Moon, and call these “Eiffel-region” and 
“Moon-region”, respectively.  Eiffel-region and Moon-region have a union: there is a 
discontinuous region—call it “Eiffel-Moon-region”—that has as subregions Eiffel-region 
and Moon-region, where any subregion of Eiffel-Moon-region has a subregion in 
common with either Eiffel-region or Moon-region.  Now, given supersubstantivalism, 
Eiffel-region and Moon-region are identical to concrete objects: the Eiffel Tower and the 
Moon, respectively.  Even though the Eiffel Tower and the Moon together exactly 
occupy Eiffel-Moon-region, we may wonder whether Eiffel-Moon-region is itself a 
concrete object.  In other words, we may wonder whether there is a gerrymandered object 
that has as parts the Eiffel Tower and the Moon, where any part of that gerrymandered 
object overlaps with either the Eiffel Tower or the Moon.   
Supplemented with (23), the Second Argument from Vagueness gives us an 
answer here.  The left disjunct of (22)—Unrestricted Composition—implies by itself that 
the Eiffel Tower and the Moon compose something.  The right disjunct of (22) implies 
that Eiffel-Moon-region is concrete.  It then follows that the subregions of Eiffel-Moon-
region compose it, from the right to left direction of (23) and modus ponens.  Though the 
conclusion of the Second Argument from Vagueness is disjunctive, both disjuncts ensure 
Unrestricted Composition, given (23).    
 Anyone who wishes to deny both disjuncts of (22) must face the premises of the 
Second Argument from Vagueness.  It’s unclear how Effingham could respond to these 
premises, since he rejects no premise of Sider’s original Argument from Vagueness, and 
the Second Argument from Vagueness includes his own argument for unrestricted 
concreteness.  I conclude that Effingham hasn’t successfully responded to Sider, since 
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Sider can embrace Effingham’s argument for unrestricted concreteness.  Sider can then 
combine that argument with his original Argument from Vagueness for Unrestricted 
Composition, and together with (23), achieve the same ontology of concrete objects that 
one might have thought he did in the first place.   
5 Conclusion 
 As Wake (2010: 35) and Effingham (2009: 42) correctly point out, the fact that 
supersubstantivalists have the resources to respond to the Argument from Vagueness may 
strike some as one reason to endorse supersubstantivalism.  Moreover, because 
supersubstantivalists can and should deny a premise of the Argument from Vagueness, 
Sider’s argument for Unrestricted Composition is in tension with other claims he makes 
in Four-Dimensionalism.  After all, Sider (2001: 110-114) is friendly to 
supersubstantivalism there.  Furthermore, I take it that my proposal suggests a general 
strategy for rejecting a premise of Sider’s argument: find some precise expression in 
terms of which to state the precisifications of ‘material object’.  We may then consider 
‘material object’ to be a vague predicate and hold that there are vague cut-offs in a 
continuous series (i.e., hold that there are instances of ‘the xs compose’ that are neither 
determinately true nor determinately false).  If we find a suitable expression in terms of 
which to state the precisifications of ‘material object’, we’re in a position to regard the 
argument from vagueness “just another sorites”.  As we’ve seen above, 
supersubstantivalists are in this position. 
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